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Language is an inherently social behavior. In this paper, we bring together two research
areas that typically occupy distinct sections of the literature: perspective taking in
spatial language (whether people represent a scene from their own or a different
spatial perspective), and perspective taking in action language (the extent to which
they simulate an action as though they were performing that action). First, we note
that vocabulary is used inconsistently across the spatial and action domains, and
propose a more transparent vocabulary that will allow researchers to integrate action-
and spatial-perspective taking. Second, we note that embodied theories of language
comprehension often make the narrow assumption that understanding action descriptions
involves adopting the perspective of an agent carrying out that action. We argue that
comprehenders can adopt embodied action-perspectives other than that of the agent,
including those of the patient or an observer. Third, we review evidence showing that
perspective taking in spatial language is a flexible process. We argue that the flexibility of
spatial-perspective taking provides a means for conversation partners engaged in dialogue
to maximize similarity between their situation models. These situation models can then
be used as the basis for action language simulations, in which language users adopt a
particular action-perspective.
Keywords: embodied cognition, spatial perspective, agency, action perspective, situation models
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, research into language comprehension has
increasingly been framed in terms of a link between perceptual
and motor systems, and higher level cognitive tasks. A central
assumption of such Embodied Cognition frameworks is that peo-
ple’s understanding of language is grounded in their physical
interactions with the world (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Pulver-
müller, 2005; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Glenberg et al., 2008a;
Glenberg and Gallese, 2012). In strong versions of Embodied
Cognition, language comprehension is achieved through mental
representations that correspond, in perceptual or motor qualities,
to the object or action being described. Such accounts draw on
evidence that comprehenders are faster to correctly match sen-
tences to images that correspond to the perceptual characteristics
implied by the sentence context, such as orientation (Stanfield and
Zwaan, 2001), shape (Zwaan et al., 2002; Pecher et al., 2009), and
implied movement (Kaschak et al., 2005, 2006).
In addition, Action-Sentence Compatibility Effects (ACE;
Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002) demonstrate that language
comprehension is linked to action execution. Participants are
faster to respond to sentences that imply moving the hand away
from or towards one’s body (e.g., “Close/Open the drawer”), when
the direction of response required (away from or towards their
body) matches the direction ofmovement implied in the sentence.
Aravena et al. (2010) recently provided evidence of a neural signa-
ture for ACE effects by recording event-related (brain) potentials.
In this study, participants listened to sentences implying an
open or closed hand shape, and indicated their understanding
by responding with either an open or closed hand shape.
Incongruent trials, where the hand-shape implied by the sentence
did not match the hand-shape required by the response, resulted
in an N400 effect (associated with difficulty integrating stimuli
into a given semantic context; Kutas and Federmeier, 2000). Such
evidence is consistent with the viewpoint that action language
comprehension involves representing an action as though you
were performing it yourself—that is, from an agent’s perspective.
In this paper, we explore research into action-perspective
taking (from whose perspective do language users simulate a
described action?), and spatial-perspective taking (from whose
perspective do language users conceive spatial relations?). We pro-
pose that these two forms of perspective taking are fundamentally
linked: in order for language users to perform an action simu-
lation, they must first establish a spatial context for that action,
by locating it within a situation model. In dialogue, spatial-
perspective taking can be used by interlocutors to negotiate or
align on situation models that specify similar spatial relations
between entities, to ensure a mutually understood spatial context
for actions. Actions are performed in space, and, therefore, we
might expect considerable cross-over between the literatures on
action- and spatial-perspective taking, but this does not appear to
be the case. We argue that one reason for this situation is the use
of inconsistent and conflicting terminology across the two fields.
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Our goal in this paper is to unite action- and spatial-perspective
taking in an account of action language comprehension. First, we
propose a vocabulary for discussing action-perspective taking that
will allow action- and spatial-perspective taking to be integrated.
Next, we explore evidence from the Embodied Cognition litera-
ture, investigating which action-perspective comprehenders typi-
cally adopt. We argue that, contrary to some Embodied Cognition
accounts where action-perspective taking is typically assumed
to be fixed on the agent, several other perspectives are in fact
available. We then review research into which spatial-perspective
people tend to adopt in language use, and how such perspective
taking is negotiated in dialogue. Finally, we propose the Spatial
Grounding Hypothesis, which states that action simulations are
grounded in spatial context. We discuss the evidence in favor
of this hypothesis, and explore the role of situation models in
providing this context.
REPRESENTING OTHER PEOPLE’S ACTIONS
At the same time as theories of action-language processing have
stressed the primacy of motor representations, theories of action
understanding have argued that the same mental representations
are involved in both performing and perceiving actions (e.g.,
Grèzes and Decety, 2001; Prinz and Hommel, 2002). For example,
Common Coding theory (Prinz, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001)
proposes that codes for planned actions and perceived actions
share a common representational domain. In support of this
account, behavioral research suggests first, that participants are
less able to perceive a static stimulus (left or right pointing
arrow) when performing a congruent action (left or right button
press; Müsseler and Hommel, 1997), and second, that perceiving
an action while planning an incompatible action affects action
execution (Brass et al., 2000; Kilner et al., 2003). In other words,
the link between perception and action affects our ability both to
perceive stimuli, and to perform actions. Such findings are echoed
by recent neurological research showing evidence of “mirror
matching”, where regions of the motor system that are activated
when performing an action are also activated when passively
perceiving an action (e.g., Buccino et al., 2001; Grèzes et al., 2003;
for a review see Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).
Much research has argued that the perceiver of an action men-
tally simulates executing that action herself (Decety, 2002). This
simulation theory has counterparts in simulation theories of mind
that propose that understanding another person involves simu-
lating their mental activity (e.g., Gallese and Goldman, 1998).
Indeed, it could be argued that a successful theory of mind is
one that allows us to predict and understand our own and other
peoples’ actions, and that this is achieved through simulation
(Ruby and Decety, 2001). The close link between self and other
then begs the question: how do we distinguish our own actions
or mental activities from those of other people? The ability to
distinguish ourselves from other people is critical to successful
social interaction, but in a system in which our own actions
share representations with the actions of other people, action
attribution becomes a key computational problem (Decety and
Sommerville, 2003; de Vignemont and Haggard, 2008).
The mechanism by which the separation of self and other is
maintained is beyond the scope of this paper (see, for example,
Ruby and Decety, 2001, 2004; Decety and Sommerville, 2003).
But however it is achieved, the self-other distinction is tightly
connected with perspective taking. First, self must be successfully
distinguished from other in order for there to be the possibility
of different perspectives (Jeannerod, 2006). Second, the ability
to represent other people’s actions in a similar way to their own
allows people to take an agent’s perspective on an action, even
when they are describing or hearing about an action performed
by somebody else.
A TAXONOMY OF PERSPECTIVE
As highlighted above, a large body of research now suggests a link
between language processing and sensorimotor activation (see
Kiefer and Pulvermüller, 2012; Meteyard et al., 2012 for recent
reviews). This link can best be captured by Embodied Cognition
accounts of language processing.1 Embodied Cognition seeks to
distinguish itself from “traditional” psycholinguistic accounts by
insisting that language representations are modal rather than
amodal (e.g., Zwaan and Taylor, 2006; Barsalou, 2008). What
is often not made explicit in Embodied Cognition accounts is
that modal representations are inherently perspective-based. For
a representation to be modal, it must assume a given perspective.
In other words, the perspective is necessary to ground the rep-
resentation. However, discussion of perspective taking in action
language is often opaque, and this is particularly problematic if
we wish to relate action-perspective taking and spatial-perspective
taking.
In visual cognition, researchers distinguish between two
types of spatial-perspective taking. Level 1 perspective involves
understanding what falls within another individual’s line of
sight—for example, is a particular object occluded by another
object as that person looks at it? Level 2 perspective involves
understanding how the world appears from another person’s
perspective—for example, is a particular object to the left or
the right of another object as that person looks at it? (Flavell
et al., 1981; Michelon and Zacks, 2006). In the present paper,
we limit our review of spatial-perspective to this second level,
focusing on spatial relations, rather than visibility. Kessler
and Rutherford (2010) argued that Level 2, but not Level 1
spatial-perspective taking, appears to involve some form of
covert mental rotation or simulation. As such, Level 2 spatial-
perspective entails a level of embodiment that Level 1 does not,
and is therefore closer to the perspective-bound simulations
proposed by Embodied Cognition accounts of action-language
understanding.
With respect to Level 2 spatial-perspective taking, we can
contrast intrinsic, absolute, and relative reference frames (see
Levinson, 1996, 2003). In an intrinsic reference frame, the posi-
tion of an object is described relative to a reference object (e.g.,
“The window is above the door”). In an absolute reference frame,
the position of an object is described in terms of stable envi-
ronmental features, such as points of the compass, as in “The
1Note our use of the term “embodied” refers specifically to Embodied (or
“grounded”) Cognition accounts of language, not to “embodied” versus
“disembodied” perspectives, as sometimes discussed in the spatial perspective
literature (e.g., Tversky and Hard, 2009).
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ship is south of the island”. Neither of these reference frames
locates an object relative to an observer. A relative reference
frame, on the other hand, does just that: for example, “The car
is to my left”. Within a relative reference frame, one can adopt
an egocentric or allocentric perspective. An egocentric perspective
entails representing objects in a scene from your own viewpoint,
and an allocentric perspective entails representing objects from
the viewpoint of someone other than yourself (see Levinson,
2003 for a fuller treatment of spatial reference frames). The
terms egocentric and allocentric therefore have specific and well-
established meanings in the spatial literature: egocentric means
conceptualizing space from your own point of view, and allocen-
tric means conceptualizing space from another’s point of view.
In the literature on Embodied Cognition, however, researchers
often use egocentric to refer to putting oneself in someone else’s
shoes (for example, interpreting a sentence such as “John kicked
Mary” as though the comprehender herself were performing the
act of kicking; e.g., Willems et al., 2010). This use of the term
is opposite that in spatial-perspective taking and is therefore
confusing. In addition, using the term egocentric perspective in
action language, or allocentric perspective in spatial language,
does not specify whose shoes the comprehender is putting herself
into. In spatial language, this underspecification is typically not
problematic, since the perspective adopted in a sentence such
as “John is looking at the picture on the left” can be explicitly
clarified. The comprehender can legitimately ask “on whose left?”,
and the speaker can reply “on my left”, “on your left”, “on his left”,
etc. However, in action language, perspective-taking is implicit,
rather than explicit, and no such clarification is possible. For
example, a comprehender who responded to the sentence “John
is looking at the picture on the left”, with the query “who is
looking?” would receive the reply “John”, and remain no clearer
about whose perspective the speaker was adopting. Therefore,
unlike spatial language, when discussing action language it is
necessary for embodied accounts to specify whose perspective
is being adopted for a particular action: the term egocentric
perspective tells us that comprehenders are putting themselves in
somebody else’s shoes, but crucially not whose shoes. Similarly,
researchers often speak of “situated simulations” (Marino et al.,
2012), or “sensorimotor experience” (Pecher et al., 2009) without
specifying from whose perspective this simulation or resonance
occurs. We suggest that this lack of specification derives from a
widely held assumption in embodied cognition accounts that the
agent’s perspective is adopted. However, we also suggest that this
assumption is unwarranted.
There are in fact different Embodied Cognition accounts of
language processing, and researchers in this field place varying
importance on the role of sensorimotor processing in seman-
tics (see Meteyard et al., 2012 for a recent review of positions
advocating different degrees of embodiment). However, a pre-
vailing view conceives language comprehension as an internal
simulation of the described action, as if the comprehender were
performing that action herself (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Zwaan and
Taylor, 2006; Borghi and Scorolli, 2009; Bergen and Wheeler,
2010). If it is true that action-perspective taking is fixed on
the agent’s perspective, then the underspecification of egocentric,
outlined above, is not a problem; the perspective adopted would
always coincide with the agent of the described action. However,
as we shall see, it is not clear that an agent’s perspective is
always adopted. Researchers in action language therefore need
to make clear exactly whose perspective they assume is being
adopted.
For example, in understanding “John kicked Mary”, there are
at least two embodied perspectives that could be adopted for
the action of kicking: that of John (the embodied agent); and
that of Mary (the embodied patient). If the comprehender has
reason to believe that other people are witnesses to the event
(i.e., if she has reason to include bystanders in her situation
model), then she can also adopt the perspective of a bystander
watching the kicking event unfold (the embodied observer). For
example, if a previous sentence implied the existence of a crowd
gathering around Mary and John, the comprehender can adopt
the perspective of a member of this crowd, observing John kicking
Mary. In each case, the comprehender represents the action from
the perspective of a person present in the comprehender’s model
of that event. In taking the embodied agent’s perspective, the
comprehender represents the action of kicking as though she
herself were the agent of that action, by activating the same
systems involved in executing a kicking action. In taking the
embodied patient’s perspective, the comprehender represents the
action of kicking as though she herself were the patient of that
action (presumably activating some form of empathic response
to the pain, such as wincing). In taking the embodied observer’s
perspective, the comprehender represents that action as though
she were watching it unfold, by activating the same systems that
would be recruited when observing such an action. In addition
to these embodied perspectives, there is another perspective that
the comprehender could take: that of the non-embodied observer.
Unlike an embodied participant or observer, the non-embodied
observer represents the action without running a simulation from
any particular point of view. We propose that action-perspective
taking is grounded in spatial context (see section Situation Mod-
els: Linking Spatial- and Action-Perspectives); comprehenders
will run an action simulation wherever possible, but if there is
insufficient spatial context to simulate the action from a partic-
ular perspective, comprehenders will adopt the non-embodied
observer’s perspective instead.
The sentence “John kicked Mary” refers to a transitive event
with two participants. There are of course, more complex sen-
tences in which further embodied perspectives exist. This is
the case for sentences describing ditransitive events (e.g., “John
passed the child to his wife”), or sentences where a thematic role
is occupied by more than one entity (e.g., “John kicked Mary and
Sam”). The number of potential embodied perspectives available
for a given sentence is therefore the number of participants in
that event plus that any embodied observers licensed by the com-
prehender’s situation model. We propose that these perspectives
(e.g., embodied agent, embodied patient, embodied recipient,
plus embodied observer and non-embodied observer) provide a
transparent basis for discussing action perspective taking. Using
these terms, researchers can not only distinguish between embod-
ied and non-embodied representations, but within the embodied
representations, it is possible to distinguish whose perspective is
adopted.
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DO LANGUAGE USERS CONSISTENTLY ADOPT THE AGENT’S
PERSPECTIVE?
We noted above that many embodied accounts of language
assume that if a perspective is adopted for action language, it is
the agent’s perspective (e.g., Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan
and Taylor, 2006; Wu and Barsalou, 2009). Such an assumption is
consistent with results from studies using isolated action verbs,
for example, showing somatotopic activation for specific body
parts. Research using functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) has found that passive listening to an arm-word (“pick”)
leads to increased activation in areas of the premotor and primary
motor cortex associated with arm movements; passive listening
to a face-word (“lick”) leads to increased activation in areas
associated with the face; and passive listening to a foot-word
(“kick”) lead to increased activation in areas associated with the
feet (Hauk et al., 2004; see also Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006). In other
words, the activation appears to be associated with particular acts
from the perspective of the agent of the act (e.g., the kicker) rather
than (for example) the patient (e.g., the person or thing that is
kicked). Further work using magnetoencephalography (MEG)
has demonstrated that such somatoptopic activation occurs
extremely quickly, within 200 ms of word presentation, and
even when participants are concentrating on an unrelated, non-
language based task (Pulvermüller et al., 2005). These findings
suggest that adopting an embodied agent’s perspective may occur
automatically in the early stages of semantic processing, at least
in isolated words.2
More evidence that people adopt the embodied agent’s per-
spective (as though the comprehender herself were carrying out
an action) comes from evidence for “body-specific” representa-
tions of manual action verbs (e.g., throw) in a Dutch lexical deci-
sion task (Willems et al., 2010). Left-handed participants showed
activation in the right pre-motor hand area, but right-handed
participants showed activation in the left pre-motor hand area,
despite there being no manual responses on critical trials. These
results echo findings of “body-specific” activation for motor
imagery, where left- and right-handed participants imagined per-
forming actions described by manual action verbs (Willems et al.,
2009). It therefore appears that people tend to adopt the embod-
ied agent’s perspective for isolated verbs, representing the verb
according to how they personally would perform those actions
with their particular bodies (i.e., right-handed for right-handed
participants; left-handed for left-handed participants).
However, verbs are usually processed not in isolation, but in
the context of sentences featuring noun phrases that refer to
particular entities. Do language users also adopt an embodied
agent’s perspective in action sentences, as well as isolated verbs?
2A general note of caution is needed when interpreting studies that show sim-
ilar activation in action execution and action language comprehension. These
studies are typically cited as evidence that during language comprehension,
participants simulate performing the action (in our terminology, they adopt
an embodied agent’s perspective). However, research into mirror-matching
suggests that observing and executing an action also activate similar neural
substrates (e.g., Grèzes et al., 2003; for reviews, see Decety and Sommerville,
2003; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Therefore, it is possible that activation
in motor areas during language comprehension in fact reflects the participant
mentally “observing”, rather than “executing”, the described action.
The evidence that they do is mixed. Participants undergoing
fMRI were presented with mouth-, leg-, or hand-related action
sentences featuring the pronoun (“I”) in the agent’s role (e.g.,
“Mordo la mela” [I bite the apple]; “Afferro il coltello” [I grasp the
knife]; “Calcio il pallone” [I kick the ball]; Tettamanti et al., 2005).
The results showed evidence of somatotopic activation similar to
that observed in isolated verb processing (e.g., Hauk et al., 2004),
implying that participants were simulating the described actions
from the agent’s perspective. However, in this study, the agent’s
perspective coincided with the perspective of the potentially self-
referential pronoun “I”: participants may have adopted a perspec-
tive in line with the thematic role assigned to the pronoun “I”,
rather than the perspective of the agent per se. A better indication
of whether participants routinely adopt the embodied agent’s per-
spective comes from studies investigating ACE effects (Glenberg
and Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg et al., 2008b). When sentences were
given in the form of an imperative (e.g., “Close the drawer”),
participants were faster to respond when the direction of the
response was congruent with the movement implied by the agent
in the sentence than when it was incongruent. In other words, they
appeared to adopt the perspective of an agent closing a drawer.
However, in sentences featuring two arguments, one of whom
could refer to the participant, participants were faster to respond
when the direction of the response was congruent with the move-
ment relative to the pronoun “you”. For example, participants
were faster to respond with away movements to sentences such
as “You delivered the pizza to Andy”, but faster to respond with
towardsmovements to sentences such as “Andy delivered the pizza
to you”. Therefore, this suggests that when a sentence involves a
potentially self-referential pronoun (“you”, “I”), comprehenders
tend to adopt the perspective of the thematic role assigned to that
pronoun, whether or not this coincides with the thematic agent
of the action. In a dialogue context, where sentences such as “You
are / I am cutting the tomato” are uttered and understood by each
participant in turn, the situation is more complex. Participants
appear to prioritize adopting opposing perspectives for “you”
and “I”, over maintaining a consistent perspective (e.g., embodied
agent, embodied observer) for either of the pronouns (Pickering
et al., 2012).
Several studies have addressed whether people adopt the
agent’s perspective when the agent of a described action is
not self-referential, in the absence of a second self-referential
argument. In Embodied Cognition accounts that conceive
action language as an extension of mirror-matching, where
representations of other people’s actions are inherently similar to
representations of one’s own actions (e.g., Rizzolatti and Arbib,
1998; Pulvermüller, 2005), descriptions of actions performed by
third-person agents should elicit similar effects to descriptions
of actions performed by first- or second-person agents. In line
with this prediction, Buccino et al. (2005) used transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) to stimulate the left-hemispheric
hand or foot motor areas, as participants listened to third person
hand- or foot-related action sentences (e.g., “Cuciva la gonna”
[He sewed the shirt]; “Marciava sul posto” [He marched on the
spot]), compared with control abstract sentences (e.g., “Amava la
moglie” [He loved his wife]). Motor evoked potentials (MEPs)
from the hand and foot muscles were recorded. Hand MEPs were
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modulated specifically when listening to hand-related action
sentences, and foot MEPs were modulated specifically when
listening to foot-related sentences. These results suggest at least
some tendency to adopt an embodied agent’s perspective for
third-person sentences.
However, without a direct comparison between first- and
third-person sentences, we cannot know whether action
perspective-taking in third-person sentences matches action
perspective-taking in first-person sentences. Behavioral evidence
suggests that comprehenders reading self-referential and non-
self-referential sentences adopt different action-perspectives.
Brunyé et al. (2009) used a sentence-picture matching task with
first-, second-, and third-person action sentences, and “internal”
or “external” action images. In the “internal” images, the position
of the hands meant they could plausibly be interpreted as those
of the participant. In the “external” images, the position of the
hands meant they could not plausibly be interpreted as those of
the participant. Instead, they could most plausibly be interpreted
as those of an agent who the participant was observing perform
the action. Selecting an internal image would imply adopting the
embodied agent’s perspective. Selecting an external image would
imply adopting the perspective of an embodied observer. Brunyé
et al. (2009) found that participants were faster to correctly
match first- and second-person sentences to internal rather than
external images, and to correctly match third-person sentences to
external rather than internal images. In other words, participants
adopted the embodied agent’s perspective when the agent of
the sentence could be attributed to the comprehender, but not
otherwise (see also Ditman et al., 2010; Sato and Bergen, 2013).
In an fMRI study, Tomasino et al. (2007) found no difference
in primary motor cortex activation between silent reading of
German action phrases presented in the first-person (e.g., “Ich
hämmere” [I hammer]) versus third-person (e.g.,“Er hämmert”
[He hammers]). However, Papeo et al. (2011) had participants
silently read action or non-action Italian verbs conjugated in
the first- or third-person (e.g., “Scrivo” [I write]; “Scrive” [he
writes]; “Medito” [I wonder]; “Medita” [he wonders]). They
found that TMS-induced MEPs in the relevant motor area (e.g.,
hand) increased for the first-person action verbs, but that the
third-person action verbs behaved like the non-action verbs,
and showed no increase in MEPs. Embodied Cognition accounts
need not predict total parity between first- and third-person
action representations. However, the posited involvement of
the motor system in action language comprehension (e.g.,
Fischer and Zwaan, 2008) should imply at least some difference
between third-person action and non-action verbs. The fact that
a difference between action and non-action verbs was found only
in first-person sentences led Papeo et al. (2011) to conclude that
motor simulation of an action sentence occurs only when the self
is identified as the agent of the action.
What could be behind the conflicting results of Tomasino et al.
(2007), and Papeo et al. (2011)? One important difference may
be in the task. Participants in Tomasino et al.’s study were asked
to decide whether a described event took place inside or outside
a building, and thus could complete the task without paying
attention to whether the verb was presented in the first- or third-
person. On the other hand, Papeo et al. instructed participants
to determine the syntactic subject of a phrase, thus focussing
attention on the contrast between first- and third-person agents.
Researchers are becoming increasingly aware of the role of task
demands and context in studies of Embodied Cognition. The con-
flicting results here add to evidence suggesting that motor repre-
sentations of action language may not be activated automatically,
but depend on aspects of the task, including depth of processing
(Sato et al., 2008), sentence tense (Bergen andWheeler, 2010), and
relevance to task goals (Hoedemaker and Gordon, 2013). Indeed,
it is possible to view the emphasis on the agent’s perspective in
action-language research, as a result of task demands. The link
between action and language has typically been investigated by
studying congruency effects when participants execute actions
during sentence processing (Zwaan and Taylor, 2006; Taylor and
Zwaan, 2008), after sentence processing (Glenberg and Kaschak,
2002; Glenberg et al., 2008b), or before sentence processing (Glen-
berg et al., 2008a). When the emphasis of the task is to exe-
cute an action, it is perhaps not surprising that results seem
to indicate that participants adopt the agent perspective. Other
paradigms in embodied approaches to language follow sentence
processing with image presentation rather than action execution.
For example, participants are typically faster and more accurate
to recognize an image of an object when it is presented in the
same orientation (vertical/horizontal) as implied by the preceding
sentence (Stanfield and Zwaan, 2001; see also Zwaan et al., 2002;
Pecher et al., 2009). The authors interpret these findings as evi-
dence that comprehenders run visual simulations of an event (i.e.,
they adopt an embodied observer’s perspective). The perspective
adopted by comprehender may therefore depend on the task used
to investigate it. It may even be possible to use the task to prime
participants to adopt a given action-perspective, although we
know of no study that has investigated this possibility.
In summary, some Embodied Cognition accounts of action
language assume that people adopt an embodied agent’s
perspective when comprehending action language, based on an
internal simulation of performing that action (Zwaan and Taylor,
2006; Barsalou, 2009). Moreover, strong Embodied Cognition
accounts assume that the agent’s perspective is automatically
activated, regardless of contextual factors such as the reference of
the sentence, as determined, for example, by the subject pronoun
(Pulvermüller, 2005; Pulvermüller et al., 2005). The evidence
outlined above suggests that people do adopt the embodied
agent’s perspective for isolated verbs, and for sentences in which
a potentially self-referential pronoun (“you”, “I”) is specified as
the agent (Hauk et al., 2004; Pulvermüller et al., 2005; Willems
et al., 2010). However, when a self-referential pronoun occupies
a thematic role other than agent, comprehenders appear to adopt
the perspective of the thematic role assigned to that pronoun, and
not the perspective of the agent (Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002).
When a third party is specified as the agent of an action, and no
self-referential pronoun is present, some evidence suggests that
comprehenders adopt the embodied agent’s perspective (Buccino
et al., 2005; Tomasino et al., 2007), whereas other evidence
suggests that people adopt an embodied observer’s perspective
(Brunyé et al., 2009; Papeo et al., 2011). Although more data are
clearly needed in order to draw firm conclusions about which
perspective comprehenders adopt under which circumstances,
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current data demonstrate that adopting an agent’s perspective is
not the only possibility during action language comprehension.
As a consequence, the underspecified terms egocentric or internal
perspective should be avoided when discussing action-perspective
taking. Instead, researchers in Embodied Cognition should seek
to employ more transparent terms that specify in whose shoes the
comprehender is placing herself (e.g., embodied agent, embodied
patient, embodied observer).
SPATIAL-PERSPECTIVE TAKING
So far, we have reviewed evidence examining whose action-
perspective language users tend to adopt when processing action
language sentences. However, language users can also adopt a
range of spatial-perspectives during language production or com-
prehension. Of particular interest is whether people adopt an
egocentric spatial-perspective (conceiving spatial relations from
their own point of view), or an allocentric spatial-perspective
(conceiving spatial relations from another’s point of view).
Schober (1993) asked participants to describe the location
of objects, either alone, to an imaginary addressee, or when in
the same room as a conversational partner. Participants were
more likely to describe the location from the addressee’s point
of view, using terms such “on your left”, than from their own
point of view. Schober (1995) also found that speakers tended to
adopt the addressee’s perspective in task requiring the speaker to
identify particular objects to an addressee. Interestingly, partici-
pants in Schober (1993) who described objects to an imaginary
addressee were more likely to use the addressee’s perspective than
participants whose conversation partners were present. With an
addressee absent and unable to provide feedback, it may be safer
for the speaker to assume the addressee’s perspective as often as
possible. Duran et al. (2011), using a virtual reality paradigm, also
found that participants were more likely to adopt an allocentric
spatial perspective when told that they were interacting with a
virtual, rather than real partner. It appears that believing that their
partner was real allowed participants to shift more of the burden
of mutual comprehension to their partner. The tendency to shift
responsibility for effective communication to a conversation part-
ner may be stronger when, as in Duran et al.’s (2011) study, that
partner is making a request rather than providing information.
Yoon et al. (2012) found that speakers in a modified referential
communication task were more likely to use allocentric perspec-
tive when requesting something from their partner compared
with giving information to their partner. Since it is in speakers’
interests to ensure that their requests are successfully understood,
it is sensible for listeners to assume that speakers will adopt an
allocentric perspective when making that request.
The above results show that spatial-perspective taking, like
action-perspective taking, is a flexible process. By changing the
perspective they adopt, speakers or listeners can shift more or
less of the burden of mutual comprehension on to their part-
ner. Further research suggests that during dialogue, people may
attempt to minimize not only their own effort, but the collective
effort of both conversation partners, by obeying what Clark and
Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) term the principle of least collaborative effort.
Speakers and listeners often appear to adopt spatial perspectives
in a way that maximizes the resources available. The principle
of least collaborative effort appears to be adopted especially in
cases where one partner is judged less able to complete the
communication task (Schober and Brennan, 2003). For example,
Mainwaring et al. (2009) found that speakers were more likely
to use an (allocentric) addressee’s perspective when the addressee
was under increased cognitive load. Schober (2009) studied what
happens when, unbeknownst to the participants, one partner in a
conversation has better spatial ability than another, as determined
by mental rotation test results. Participants were paired into a
director and a matcher, with no knowledge of their own or
their partner’s results on the mental rotation tests. The matcher
selected a target circle from an array, based on the director’s spatial
descriptions. Low-ability directors were more likely to take their
own (egocentric) perspective, while high-ability directors were
more likely to take their partner’s (allocentric) perspective. Over
the course of the experiment, high-ability directors who were
paired with low-ability matchers increased their use of allocentric
perspective, whereas low-ability directors who were paired with
high-ability matchers decreased their use of allocentric perspec-
tive. Note that these opposite patterns of behavior between high-
and low-ability directors is in itself reason to be cautious of basing
our understanding of spatial perspective-taking in language on
university students of (presumably) high cognitive ability.
We argue that this online adaptation to a partner’s ability to
engage in the communicative task is compatible with conversation
as conceived as a joint action (Clark, 1996; Sebanz et al., 2006;
Gambi and Pickering, 2011). In the case of spatial perspective-
taking, the perspective that people adopt appears to depend at
least partly on the ability of their partner to engage in the task.
In the next section, we argue that maximising the collective
resources in this way allows conversation partners to establish
coherent situation models in both partners. Once these situation
models have been established, language users are in a position
to adopt a particular action-perspective when performing mental
simulations of actions. However, interlocutors do not adapt only
their use of spatial-perspective within a relative reference frame;
they also appear to adapt their choice of reference frame itself.
Evidence that conversation partners align on their use of reference
frame comes from studies using a confederate-priming paradigm.
Watson et al. (2004) studied participants’ use of an intrinsic versus
a relative reference frame. Participants were more likely to use an
intrinsic reference frame after the confederate had used an intrin-
sic frame than after the confederate had used a relative reference
frame. Importantly, Watson et al. found participants regularly
switched between reference frames. Spatial-perspective taking in
dialogue is therefore highly flexible in order to allow for maximal
alignment and hence maximal similarity in situation models.
Whether such alignment on situation models occurs as a result
of automatic priming (e.g., Pickering and Garrod, 2004, 2006), or
of negotiating common ground (e.g., Clark, 1996) is beyond the
scope of this paper, but we assume both possibilities remain open.
SITUATIONMODELS: LINKING SPATIAL- AND
ACTION-PERSPECTIVES
Much research on Embodied Cognition can be traced back to
studies of situation models in language processing (e.g., Johnson-
Laird, 1983; Van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983). According to recent
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accounts, situation models are representations of specific situa-
tions described in language, where events are connected along
five dimensions: space, time, protagonist, causality, and inten-
tionality (Zwaan et al., 1995; for a review of situation models
in language, see Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998). Evidence suggests
it is the content of these models, rather than linguistic form
of the language itself, which is typically retained in memory
and integrated into updated models as comprehension continues
(Sachs, 1967; Johnson-Laird and Stevenson, 1970). For example,
Bransford et al. (1972) demonstrated that participants who read
the sentence “Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish
swan beneath them” frequently selected the linguistically different
but situationally equivalent sentence “Three turtles rested on a
floating log, and a fish swam beneath it” in a recognition test
(see also Barclay, 1973; Honeck, 1973). Many modern studies
in the Embodied Cognition literature have found similar effects
when the focus is shifted to online rather than memory processes.
For example, Borghi et al. (2004) found that participants were
faster to verify items typically found inside a given object (e.g.,
“steering wheel”) following a preamble placing them inside that
same object (e.g., “You are driving a car”) versus outside it (e.g.,
“You are refuelling a car”). They proposed that participants used
a mental simulation grounded in modal representations (e.g.,
of being inside or outside a car), which then guides property
verification (see also Kosslyn et al., 1978).
Such mental simulations are a defining feature of embod-
ied theories of language, and differ from the situation models
discussed in text or discourse processing in that they appear
to capture online processing during language comprehension.
Whereas situation models represent the integration of knowledge
about events and situations into a coherent, existing frame-
work, mental simulations are concerned with the online action-
perspective taking about a particular act (see also Zwaan, 2008 for
discussion of the differences). We propose that this “nesting” of
action simulations within situation models is what links spatial-
and action-perspective taking in language. In order for a com-
prehender to adopt an embodied perspective on an action, that
action must be grounded in a spatial context. This spatial context
is provided by the comprehender’s situation model. Situation
models are conceived from a particular spatial perspective; in
dialogue, conversation partners maximize their resources and
align on spatial-perspective and reference frames, in order to
ensure suitably similar situation models, for example by making
use of the principle of least collaborative effort (Clark, 1996).
Recall that situation models can specify events across a number
of dimensions (space, time, causality, etc.; Zwaan et al., 1995).
For our purposes, “suitably similar” situation models means
that the situation models of both interlocutors specify the same
protagonists in roughly the same spatial relations to one another.
The spatial relations between objects and people are a fun-
damental part of situation models (Tversky, 1991), and might
be specified at various levels of granularity, from coarse grained,
specifying only overall direction, to fine grained, specifying exact
distances. We propose that the minimum information required
in a situation model in order to run an action simulation is
the participants in that action and some (coarse-grained) infor-
mation about the spatial relations in which they stand. This
allows comprehenders to establish the direction and perhaps
rough distance in which an action occurs, and thus to simulate
it, adopting a particular action-perspective. When a sentence is
interpreted self-referentially (because it involves pronouns such
as “you” or “I”—and perhaps also, although we know of no
study demonstrating this—when it refers to the comprehender by
name), the comprehender creates a situation model grounded in
his or her own body; other participants in the action are by default
conceived as located in front of the comprehender. For example,
in Glenberg and Kaschak (2002), sentences such as “You delivered
the pizza to Andy” elicited ACE effects because the direction of
an action could be established (away from the comprehender’s
body), and an action-perspective could be adopted in line with the
thematic role assigned to the self-referential pronoun (embodied
agent). We refer to the idea that spatial context grounds action-
perspective taking as the Spatial Grounding Hypothesis.
The Spatial Grounding Hypothesis can explain the diverging
results we discussed earlier regarding first-person and third-
person language. Recall that Papeo et al. (2011) found that com-
prehenders appeared to adopt an embodied agent’s perspective
for first-person language, but no embodied perspective for third-
person language; whereas the results of Tomasino et al. (2007)
suggested that first- and third-person language elicited similar
action perspectives. The Spatial Grounding Hypothesis explains
these results as follows. In Papeo’s study, the first-person sen-
tences ground the situation model in the comprehender’s own
body, allowing an action simulation to occur; in the third-person
sentences, the situation model contains insufficient spatial infor-
mation for action simulation. In Tomasino et al.’s (2007) study,
the task was to decide whether the described action took place
inside or outside, thus encouraging the construction of situation
models in which to situate first- and third-person actions. Task
demands may therefore play an important role in action language
understanding, in the extent to which they provide, or encourage
participants to create, spatial context for the described actions.
For example, third-person sentences in which the direction
of the described action (e.g., turning a knob clockwise or anti-
clockwise) is apparent from the sentence context (e.g., raising or
lowering the volume) also elicit ACE-type effects where the com-
prehender adopts an embodied agent’s perspective (Zwaan and
Taylor, 2006). Further work suggests that these effects only occur
once the direction of movement (clockwise or anti-clockwise) has
been specified (Taylor et al., 2008). On the other hand, some
evidence suggests that where a described action lacks suitable
spatial grounding—for example, when it is described in the third-
person, and the spatial relations between participants are not
specified—action-perspective taking does not occur. Gianelli et al.
(2011) replicated the ACE effects in sentences featuring second-
person agents (e.g., “You gave a pizza to Louis”), but not third-
person agents (e.g., “Lea gave a pizza to Louis”). When avatars
provided spatial locations for the third-person agents, the ACE
effect reappeared. In other words, participants only adopted an
embodied agent’s action-perspective when their situation model
afforded adequate spatial context.
We have suggested that spatial context grounds action-
perspective taking, such that a comprehender can only simulate
an action from a particular perspective if her situation model
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specifies the participants in that action, and their spatial relations
(thus giving her access to the direction in which an action would
occur). We have argued that this proposal, the Spatial Grounding
Hypothesis, can incorporate apparently conflicting results about
action-perspective taking into a coherent framework. But there
are other factors that support the Spatial-Grounding Hypothesis.
First, it predicts that conversation partners will align on spatial-
perspective and choice of reference frame, in order to establish
similar situation models in both partners. We saw in the previous
section that this is indeed the case. Second, it can explain why
the presence of a potential agent other than the speaker affects
how likely the speaker is to shift her spatial perspective. Tversky
and Hard (2009) investigated the influence of a potential agent
on how likely people were to adopt an allocentric perspective.
Participants viewed photographs of scenes in which an actor was
reaching for objects (and thus, in a position to act on that object),
scenes with no actor, and scenes with an actor who was not
reaching. Participants were more likely to adopt an allocentric
spatial perspective (that of the actor in the photograph) when
the actor was reaching versus not reaching for an object.
Similarly, Zwickel (2009) investigated what spatial-perspective
participants adopted when watching clips of animated triangles
that they perceived as more or less agentive (Abell et al., 2000).
Zwickel provided some evidence that participants only adopt an
allocentric perspective when they view the other entity as an agent
with specific states of mind, rather than a non-agentive entity
moving at random. Mazzarella et al. (2012) recently extended
Tversky and Hard’s (2009) study by manipulating the extent to
which the actor was in a position to act on the object (grasping
versus gazing). Images in which the actor was in a better position
to act on the object (grasping) triggered more use of allocentric
spatial perspective in participants compared with images in which
the actor was in a less good position to act on the object (gazing).
All of this suggests that participants are more likely to adopt an
allocentric spatial-perspective in the presence of someone they
perceive as a potential agent.
On the other hand, research suggests that the ability to extract
information useful for object interaction (e.g., size) is diminished
when participants adopt an allocentric, rather than egocentric
spatial-perspective (Campanella et al., 2011). In addition, par-
ticipants are faster to execute a reach-to-grasp movement when
the object also falls within the peripersonal, rather than extrap-
ersonal, space of a second person, implying that people tend
to be faster to interact with objects in the presence of another
potential agent (Gianelli et al., 2013). Given that participants want
to interact with objects more quickly in the presence of another
potential agent, and given that adopting an allocentric perspective
may impede their ability to do so, why, then, would participants
be more likely to adopt an allocentric perspective in the presence
of another potential agent? Tversky and Hard (2009) suggested
that their participants, in order to make sense of the scene, tried to
understand the possibility that the other person can interact with
the objects. We propose that people find it easier to understand
another person’s potential actions when they understand the
spatial relations in the other person’s situation model; that is,
when they conceive space from that person’s perspective. Spatial-
perspective taking can therefore augment a situation model by
increasing awareness of an agent’s potential actions, even when no
action is described.
One argument against the Spatial Grounding Hypothesis is
that that situation models are often underspecified, and do not
provide comprehenders with the necessary spatial context in
which to situation action simulations. In particular, isolated verbs
provide no explicit spatial context, and yet evidence suggests that
comprehenders do adopt an embodied agent’s perspective on the
actions that the verbs describe (e.g., Hauk et al., 2004; Willems
et al., 2010). We suggest that participants typically interpret these
isolated verbs as self-referential (even when they are not presented
in the imperative). Thus, like explicitly self-referential language,
the comprehender’s own body grounds her situationmodel in this
case. In other cases, where the comprehender’s situation model
does not allow her to establish at least the coarsely-coded spatial
relations involved in an action, she cannot adopt an embodied
action-perspective, because the action simulation cannot be run.
However, this does not mean that the sentence describing an
action cannot be understood. Rather, the comprehender can
adopt the perspective of a non-embodied observer. This perspec-
tive is not an embodied perspective, in the sense that it does not
involve a simulation of the action from the perspective of any of
the participants. However, it is sufficient to allow the compre-
hender to understand the sentence, even if that understanding
is somewhat less fully specified than the situation in which an
embodied action-perspective can be adopted. Researchers have
found that non-ice hockey players respond more slowly and show
less pre-motor activation than expert ice hockey players do when
reading sentences about ice hockey (Beilock et al., 2008), but
this does not mean that they fail to understand the sentences.
Their understanding may be impoverished relative to that of
the expert players, but comprehension is not an all or nothing
process (Taylor and Zwaan, 2013). Just as non-expert players
may supplement their understanding of ice hockey using infor-
mation and inferences about similar experiences (e.g., playing
field hockey), comprehenders with inadequate situation mod-
els may supplement their models by adopting a non-embodied
observer’s perspective based on memories or inferences about
similar situations.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have attempted to reconcile two largely distinct
literatures concerned with spatial-perspective taking and action-
perspective taking. We have proposed a transparent vocabu-
lary for action-perspective taking, which we hope will facilitate
research between these two domains. At the heart of our proposal
is the suggestion that researchers working in Embodied Cogni-
tion must specify from whose perspective a given action is being
simulated. Although an agent’s perspective seems in many cases
the most natural candidate, other perspectives are possible, and
are often adopted when self-referential pronouns are assigned a
thematic role other than agent.
We have argued that comprehenders can only adopt an
action-perspective if they have a spatial context for that action
(the Spatial Grounding Hypothesis). In the case of isolated
verbs and self-referential pronouns, people typically take their
spatial grounding from their own bodies. But in the absence
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of self-referential language, action-perspective taking can only
occur when the spatial relations between participants in the
action have been established within the comprehender’s situation
model. In dialogue, interlocutors use spatial-perspective taking to
ensure that each partner’s situation model specifies similar spatial
relations.
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